Ch. 2 Study Questions

1. As far as I can understand O’Shaughnessy, the a priori limit to extending the will beyond the body, is not a logical one because it does not come strictly out of a sense of logical reasoning (which is what one would normally think if one was to consider something a priori). However, it comes to us instead as a part (and problem) of our language. The limit of the will over the extra-bodily arises a priori from a misuse of our language when one tries to say things like “He will a chair raising.” In other words (namely, O’Shaughnessy’s words) he means “we cannot as yet say that we can will the movement of the extra-bodily”. To say so, is a misuse of our language, hence an a priori limit set to us. Or something like that.

2. Natural-kind terms usually do not come about simply by obtaining some sort of image of a thing x, in one’s mind and applying the name x. Instead, natural-kind terms get their origin from repeated observations that consistently fall under a description agreed upon by some members of a group. This description is made up of several “markers”or, perhaps character traits which single out x as an individual from the panoply of the universe. This can happen whether or not the group knows all of the items traits or not. Say, they could just know about a rock, that it is black, shiny, does not move, it’s cold, and it has a hard texture. These markers can be used to form a natural-kind term “coal” for the rock. They might later discover that this rock is good for fuel. But this does not change the term “coal” for the same thing is picked out at one time as “good for fuel” as was originally picked out by “black shiny rock”. So, it is by convention and by categorical indicators that natural-kind terms come to be.

3.The category into which a thing fits, vs. the properties that single it out as an individual??


4. “Contextual Considerations”are a certain type of “epistemological marker” that have to do with the location, or origin of the term in question. These play a significant role in the application of the term, as we would very seldom (unless waxing metaphorical) take something found normally on a tree (eg. bark) and apply it to something found on a person (eg. skin). To do so would be to misuse the word. Since skin is in one context (on animals), and bark is in another (on trees), there are distinctive differences in the natural-kind terms.

5. An injudicious use of a natural-kind term is to disregard some natural markers like location/origin when applying a term to something. Like say, calling a thing that wags its tail on Mars a dog. It may very well be a dog, and the user of the term may be right, but since some of the markers like “earth mammal” may have been missing, it is an injudicious use of the term. A misuse of the term, although often signaled by ignoring markers, is different because it is only a misuse when one uses the term to stand for something that it does not stand for. In other words, it is a misuse only when the person is wrong about what they believe to be signaling. As O’Shaughnessy says, “It is what one understands by the word in the act of using it that determines whether or not the word has been misused.” Eg. If one understands a term to mean root-beer and they are applying it to ginger-ale, then the term has been misused.

6. One might think they know the meaning of a word and not really know it. Like a three year old thinks they understand the meaning of the word “tree” and they go around calling anything made out of wood a “tree”. This is a misuse of the term, even if they are in fact at the time pointing at a tree. So, factually, they said tree when they saw tree. But since they only understood the term to mean “contains wood” they have misused the term, for that is not what the term “tree” stands for.
One might also use a word to stand for what they think it does not designate. So, if one says to the child that they are going to the “movies” meaning that they are going to party with their friends, this is a misuse of the word movies, whether or not it is factual that they are going to the movies. One could end up partying in a movie theater, or going to a movie at any rate (despite their plans to party), but the term was still misused, because it was not really used to designate going to the movies.

7.The markers of physical action are problematically first-person, or at least subjective. The markers generally have to do with some “interior psychic conditions” and a resulting “physical condition” of limb movement. In other words, there is some internal process that results in the movement of a suitable part of the body (that one could move eg. A finger as opposed to a hair follicle). A marker, again is a epistemological pointer to the fact that some motion is going on. We know that we are moving something by the fact that something we can move is moving, and there is an internal state or willing which has corresponded with it’s doing so. The marker that creates a contextual requirement (a place in which one would very singly find such an event) is in a body. Or the marker “part of a body” that is doing the moving.

8. It if it does have a sense, we do not know it yet, because the use of the term will is something contextually bound to bodies, and since you are asking one to “will outside of their body” you are misusing the term “will”. When you say “will a chair to rise” you are not referring to will as it is properly delineate. Just like the little child who is familiar enough with the concept tree to know that trees are made of wood, and goes around calling everything wooden a tree...you are misusing the term. We do not have any concept of what it would be for a willing to be extra-bodily.

9. Putnam, criticizes the theory that the meaning of natural-kind terms comes from an internal conjuring of an image of a thing x. In other words, she thinks that the mind does not produce anything that in and of itself has anything to do with how a natural-kind term comes to be. Instead, natural-kind terms lie in epistemic markers and social conventions as repeatedly observed by the mind.

10. The criteria for a term are the necessary and sufficient conditions for which the thing of itself that the term is delineating to obtain. The markers or pointers are the few of the criteria that we can observe (at one time or another with varying degrees of completeness) that help us as a social group single out one thing from the panoply of the universe and give it a natural-kind term. The criteria for the term (the facts that determine whether or not it is properly used) are the underlying necessary facts of the term which we may or may not have within our purview.